

Dreamlike Images in Fellini's *8 1/2* and Tarkovsky's *The Mirror*: A Cognitive Approach

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1.

At the beginning of the 1960s, a particular form of film composition began to take on increasing importance; besides depicting "actual" occurrences, these films also reflected "mental events" by showing subjective memories, imaginary scenes, fantasies, and dreams. This body of work, which now almost seems like a group style, includes not only Alain Resnais' *Hiroshima mon amour* (1959), *L'Année dernière à Marienbad*, and *Muriel* (1963), Federico Fellini's *Otto e mezzo* (*8 1/2*, 1963) and *Giulietta degli spiriti* (1965), Ingmar Bergman's *Persona* (1966), and Luis Buñuel's *Belle de jour* (1966), but also Nagisa Oshima's *Hakuchu no torima* (1966) and Andrej Tarkovsky's *Zerkalo* (*The Mirror*, 1975).

Not only did these films include dreams or related psychic states. Important characteristics of these sequences seem to be transmitted to the composition and narrative form of the film as a whole, giving the overall film composition dreamlike characteristics. Dreamlike is here understood in the sense of Carl Gustav Jung, who saw dreams as "involuntary psychic activity" that "is just conscious enough to be reproducible in the waken state." Like actual dreams in Jung's characterization, the films present many "irrational states" and were thus "less transparent and comprehensible."ⁱ

Spectators and critics alike have often been fascinated by these moments of film composition, but they pose a challenge of the first degree for film analysis. It is often difficult to grasp relationships within their composition, and in some cases regularities in terms of narration can hardly be found; as a result, the

interpretation of such works becomes increasingly arbitrary or itself takes on the blurry aspect of dreams. The more unconscious elements of experience communicated by the films thus seemed in this way to push towards the foreground.

Since the problems of the analytic method that then became acute have still not been settled, I will focus on this aspect and sketch out a cognitive-psychological oriented model of description. This model will make it easier to represent structural relations within these films that are perhaps difficult to apprehend, but nonetheless present: in particular, relations of a narrative kind. In addition, I would like to combine a discussion of this model approach, which has been published elsewhere in greater elaboration,ⁱⁱ with an exploration of some of Jung's ideas about problems related to dreams and the archetype.

II.

The two film examples on which I would like to concentrate, Federico Fellini's *8 1/2* and Andrei Tarkovsky's *The Mirror*, can be considered open artworks in Eco's sense; they strive towards an aesthetic effect that transmits the "fundamental ambiguity of the artistic message," and do so by using a structure that is expressed in the "very elements that strive towards the aesthetic result,"ⁱⁱⁱ that is, through extended representations of dreams with their unconscious moments.

True to the notion of "form as a field of possibility,"^{iv} both films can thus be analyzed as special cases of the open artwork, which exhibit regularities despite all their blurry, ambiguous "dreamings." But this of course is only true if the receptive structure of the work is included in the analysis as well as the psychic activities of the spectator; like those of a cognitive kind.

This is where my descriptive model becomes useful: by attempting to grasp cognitive activities within film reception, including those phases of cognition of which the spectator is only minimally conscious. In this way, I hope to contribute to the objectivization of the unconscious moments of experience brought into film composition with dream representation.

Films are usually described in terms of concrete processes: the conflictual action of certain figures, for example. To complement this mode of description, we can also see film composition as providing sensory stimuli that serve as guidelines for the spectator's reception. In this way, certain acts of abstraction made by the author-directors vis-à-vis reality become visible behind each individual occurrence. In a sense, these acts of abstraction are layered. The particular layer of abstraction results from its respective stage in phasic information processing. According to Georg Klaus' epistemology,^v at least three phases of cognitive invariants or schema can be distinguished in this process: the level of perception, the level of thought, and the level of stereotype (or motif formation).

Each of the events and appearances shown in film thus also has a corresponding mental status: we can thus distinguish among perception-based, concept-based, or stereotype-based film structures.^{vi}

Since all external structures stored in memory can be classified as one of these structural types, based on a corresponding phase of information processing or learning, film composition can be approximately described along a web of structural relations that is determined by perception, conception, or stereotype. All three types of structure can become semantically effective, although each in a different way, and each has an influence on narration. Within filmic representation, each insures a respectively different view of the events shown.^{vii}

This series of events can become a concept-based film structure when a plot focuses on conflicts of interest among the figures and makes these apparent and conscious by using plot points. This then results in a causal chain of significant events, as required by the Aristotelian *fabula*.

The traditional *fabula* of narrative cinema, in which the cognitive structure insures that the spectator is readily aware of occurrences in the film, has already been demolished to a considerable degree or is entirely absent in films like *8 1/2* and *The Mirror*. This thus presents a problem for analysis, since filmic events escape the grasp of thought, or indeed objectivation in general.

Fellini summarizes the *fabula* of his film as follows: "The story of a director that is supposed to make a film, which he then forgets, and which then takes progresses in two directions, that of fantasy and that of reality."^{viii}

This apparently clear structure, which results from a clear dramatic conflict and the inevitable self-questioning of the protagonist, had by no means this easy clarity for the spectators at the time, for the course of actual events in the film is broken and overgrown in a quite baroque way, dominated by memories of childhood, imaginary notions, fantasies, dreams, and daydreams. New about these representations of memories and dreams was that not only that they were not clearly distinguished from real events, but also followed in the succession of real events, often making orientation very difficult. On top of this, there was a strange doubling between the situation of the film protagonist and the personal situation of the author-director, since Fellini came up with the central idea of the film—a protagonist searching in his own mind for a way out of the dilemma, and who is also a director by profession—only after beginning his own project. For the audience, the contours of the two film projects began to blur; this not only further

complicated the objectivation of the occurrences in the film, but also caused the spectator to find him or herself placed in a kind of “artwork in flux.”^{ix}

The Mirror goes much further in destroying the classical *fabula*. There is no longer a central dramatic conflict, other than a very abstract conflict between the individual and the powers of history. After interviewing his mother on family history in the early phase of the project, Tarkovsky replaced her verbal answers with acted scenes depicting his own childhood; just before the end of filming, he also added a commentary spoken by an autobiographical narrator, which had been intended neither in the concept nor in the screenplay.^x The questioning of the mother thus became a kind of self-questioning of the author, whose fictive protagonist reflects about his feelings for those close to him, about his—

Tarkovsky writes “my”—“eternal sympathy for her, but also my failure and my feeling of everlasting debt to her.”^{xi} This self-interrogation is realized on countless narrative levels: an epic present, an epic flashback, precisely dated documentary insertions, other more metaphoric scenes with a less specific sense of time, and clear dream scenes, daydreams, genre scenes with his own mother, voice-overs of lyric poems written by his own father, and finally the authorial commentary. The spectator’s orientation is made no easier by the use of different colors of film stock (beside the normal color of the epic present tense, childhood is colored sepia brown, and documentary sequences are black and white) and the fact that the roles of the protagonist’s wife and the younger mother in the memories of childhood are played by the same actress. Thus, the narrative structure of *The Mirror* is not only a paradigmatic example of what in Russia is termed “*bessyuzhetny*,” or “plot-less,” it also constantly confronts the spectator with visual and acoustic stimuli that have undergone varying degrees of processing. In this way, the spectator is denied the information of whether he or she finds himself in

a real world, or a remembered, imagined, dreamed world—an effect compounded by the fact that hardly any natural effects are reproduced on the soundtrack.

In both films, the fragmentation of the central dramatic plot into episodic sequences and separate images is additionally supported by the frequent use of very expressive shots that seem simultaneously autonomous and ambivalent. In addition, the linkages use a specific form of montage that does not at all require the logic of the causal chain; called “distance montage” by Russian filmmakers during this period,^{xii} this technique further contributes to eliminating the traditional clear demarcation of the dream sequences.

Faced with the lack of conceptualization on the level of narration, the spectator is forced to orient himself in a way that places him or her in a position like that of searching protagonist struggling to articulate himself. In terms of film history, this results in a transformation comparable to what Ricardou noted for the narration of the *nouveau roman*, the shift from the traditional “narrative of an adventure” (le récit d’une aventure) to the “adventure of a narrative” (l’aventure d’un récit).^{xiii} To describe analogous forms of representation in the work of Alain Resnais, film critics of the time coined the term “*mise en conscience*.”^{xiv}

III.

Even if the loss of the traditional fabula in the sense of a predominant causal chain results in the disappearance of the usual reference system for the comprehension and interpretation of the film plot, this does not necessarily entail a categorical refusal of coherent filmic narrative or overall meaning. At the same time, the representation of dreams with this effect of limitlessness does not legitimate an arbitrariness of composition or a refusal of meaning. Instead, the law of association between events and thus the coherence of a film story can obtain

on the level of perception, as a result of perception-based structures. A connection between individual events, like episodes of a film plot, is established by forming similar complex stimulus patterns and thus a “web of homologous forms.”^{xv} Although such a structural invariant can only be received on the level of perception and only minimally become conscious in the spectator’s actual experience of the film, on the basis of the multiple repetition of the same stimulus pattern a corresponding attitude of expectation is formed on the part of the spectator in his or her internal model. In the cycle of perception, this pattern is increasingly stabilized and as a cognitive schema provides hypotheses for the subsequent process of reception. In this way, the invariant structure becomes increasingly apparent and ever more effective in art-semantic terms. Already on the perceptive level, a concentration in terms of relations of meaning begins to emerge, a topic.

Eco, following van Dijk, occasionally spoke of the “aboutness” of topics in literature that offer the reader in search of orientation a certain answer to the question of what a text is about.^{xvi} If such an aboutness of a cinematic kind becomes repeatedly present over the course of a film’s events, it can also take on a narrative function. As a topic series, it can become a foundational structure of filmic narration.

Topic series in a wide degree of varying conspicuousness, density, and relevance can be found in every well-composed film. A crucial aspect of open forms of narration, where the causal chain is lacking, is that the causal chain can be replaced by a carefully arranged topic series that can independently support a film plot. Clearly, the directed expectation of the active spectator can thus produce a connection between filmic events, providing the film story with coherence.

It is no accident that while making *The Mirror* Tarkovsky said that it is “becoming ever clearer to him that the principle of sticking to one single issue for the sake of completeness” is “of great importance for the cinema, more than in other art genres.”^{xvii} In fact, in *The Mirror*, the most important law of association besides the narrator’s commentary is formed by a topic series traced through the entire film. In seven extensive montage sequences, a related stimulus pattern is present in constantly varying repetitions: a traumatic state is followed by the phase of its resolution. In the scene before the opening credits, we witness a young man whose stuttering is healed by a speech therapist using hypnosis. Later, the traumas become more violent, and their resolution is more difficult and dragged out; they are thus often presented in a time loop, making the scenes even more dreamlike.

The situation of fear that grips the mother, who thinks she was guilty of fateful print error in the Stalin era, is followed by walk down a corridor that is extended in an unreal way, and then the liberating cleansing of a shower.

The vehement movements of fighters and victims from the Spanish Civil War who emigrated to the Soviet Union are contrasted with the soft upward floating of a Russian captive balloon from the period, and then followed by dreamlike images of the first space flight.

Another moment in this topic series is the fear situation of children who await the explosion of a hand grenade after it drops on the shooting range; after a few minutes of tense waiting, the grenade turns out to be a dummy. This then leads into a complex of long shots showing the soldiers of the Red Army on their march through the Shiwash Lake. The muddy floor of the lake slows the soldiers’ movements, giving them an unreal quality.

The director explained that these documentary shots also illustrated the monstrous price paid by the Russian soldiers for the turn-around in World War II.^{xviii} The film thus both treats traumatic situations of the society and the individual. Phases of violent contraction and the decelerated, distracted solution of traumatic conditions form the fundamental pattern of the film; this pattern, repeated seven times, then forms a kind of story line. A number of times, when Tarkovsky did not find this unique, alienating time-delay in the natural movement itself, he even used slow-motion, in violation of his declared principle of wanting to remain within the “sealed time” of real processes. This effect is intensified even further. At one point in the film, the slaughter of a rooster is followed by a shot showing the mother, who is floating horizontally in the air. On the one hand, due to their moments of irrationality, scenes like this give the film its visionary, dreamlike character; at the same time, their inclusion in the topic series provides a noticeable narrative structure. The topics thus also bind the dreams and fragmentary memories in a dramaturgical connection. This regularity is of course fragile. Even if Tarkovsky searched for the unifying theme, he frankly stated that its discovery could hardly be achieved by way of conscious reflection. He quotes Rilke, who said that artists should not come upon their ideas in a conscious state; progress should instead remain a riddle to the artist, and come upon him so suddenly so that in the moment of their emergence they are unrecognizable as such.^{xix}

In the “real” level of plot in *8 1/2*, Guido, the protagonist, abandons his film project and all further artistic strivings. But over the course of the film, Fellini formed a dense topic series that expresses anything but capitulation. The director Guido is repeatedly shown in positions that testify that he can cope with life and face situations in a playful, euphoric, and dreamlike way. Almost every scene

ends on a light note, with playful, dancing movement. The series of similar semantic gestures that thus emerges saturates both real and the imaginary worlds. It begins in the opening scene, where we see the hero in a panic dream in which he suffocates in a car. He is finally able to free himself, and begins a high flight across the sea. This continues though to the end, when in a dream-like sequence a great celebration of creativity is held: the carnevalesque reversal of the dilemma and at the same time the incarnation of all euphoria. The constant recurrence of playful-optimistic resolutions to difficult situations makes the happy end seem plausible. In a semantic conflict against the fatalistic tendency of actual events, the topics in the end win the upper hand. They help to constitute worlds of possibility.

For the film art of these years, depictions of dreams were surely primarily necessary to make the imagination of the figures into a factor that is to be taken just as seriously as the actual relations of the social life world. At the same time, these depictions of imagination also made it easier to construct possible worlds and thus played a compensatory function, like that Jung attributes to dream.^{xx}

This compensatory function can certainly be perceived in quite different ways. Tarkovsky, who often recorded dreams in his diary, writes:

There are two kinds of dreams. In the first kind, the dreaming person controls the dream events as if he possessed magical powers. He predominates over the situation, he is the creator. In the second case, the dreamer is not in a position to control events, he is passive and suffers from the constrictions of his dream and the inability to free himself from them. Everything that happens to him is thoroughly unpleasant, horrible, and torturous (see the prose of Franz Kafka).^{xxi}

While *The Mirror* begins with the resolution of a trauma, later in the film imaginary visions and dreams dominate where the figures are not in control of the situation. Tarkovsky's polemic thus takes a different course than that of Fellini: or, to use Jung's words, his filmic dreams have a different compensatory function. They intentionally problematize the conflict situation of the individual, in particular the creative individual, vis-à-vis the then official Soviet notion of humanity that summoned up a deceptive image of harmony. Initially, the director had wanted to call the film "The Bright Day"^{xxii} or "White, White Day," but he also played with the title "Martyrologue,"^{xxiii} which he elsewhere decodes as "a register of unfortuitous experiences and events."^{xxiv} These dark components are never entirely sublated in the film. The reflections and mirroring obsessively undertaken in the film not only serve a social function of regulation, they also clearly played a compensatory function in the life of the author himself. It is said that the horrible childhood memories from the war that repeatedly haunted Tarkovsky in his dreams suddenly disappeared after the completion of the film; they seemed banished.

In these two films, the initially unconscious motifs not only become more clear and conscious through their constant repetition, but also through a reflection of the topic on numerous levels. Kreimeier writes on *The Mirror*: "The irritation of the déjà vu, as mentioned by Ignat in the scene with his mother, is the dramaturgical program of this film."^{xxv} He explains this using the mirror metaphor, which in the end provided the film's title:

The wife is reflected in the mother, the adult in the child, biography in history, the present in the past, soul in nature, and the individual in the collective that is called Russia. The young woman, who sees herself in the mirror as an old woman, could—a double riddle—be Maria, but also Natalja, Alexei's

wife, who recognizes herself in the mirror as her husband's mother. Both interpretations are possible, because the ceiling that breaks up and collapses in slow motion could both "mean" the broken parental house ("Father has left us") as well as the failed marriage. In the unsuccessful relationship, one generation is reflected in the other—also because the wishes repeat and do not awake to self-realization, but remain unfulfilled as well as unresolved.^{xxvi}

What is here represented in hermeneutic terms can also be understood in terms of models and constructs by tracing out topic chains on various levels and the mutual illumination of the one by the other. Such a mutual illumination of plot lines occurs often in so-called double novels or transitional forms, like Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*. (Tarkovksy was repeatedly occupied with this novel during the long process of making *The Mirror*, because he had planned to film it in a co-production with a West German company.)^{xxvii} It is also telling that the director was struggling at the time with a scenic sketch for Dostoevsky film, the plot of which was also to play on a number of different levels.

Numerous studies deal with the so-called *construction en abyme* of Fellini's *8 1/2*. Virmaux^{xxviii} and Metz both pointed out that although Fellini did not invent this principle of film construction, he was the first to build an entire film in this way, subjecting all individual elements to this principle. Metz writes that *8 1/2* "is a doubly mirrored film, an inferred film [...] about a filmmaker that reflects himself in his film."^{xxix} But in Fellini as well as Tarkovsky, dream representations form the starting point for technologies of reflection.

The dream-based modes of representation in these two films not only contain relatively unconscious structural relationships on the perceptive level, but also structures on the level of stereotype that are also received more or less unconsciously, even if under other conditions. Perception-based structures rely on stimulus patterns where the schema formation has only just begun, thus allowing the forms to go almost unnoticed, and maintains them at a preconscious level. In contrast, stereotypes are forms in a late stage of cognitive appropriation; long ago conceptualized, due to their multiple communicative use they have long surpassed their maximum conspicuousness and are only received accidentally by the spectator and often unconsciously due to habit. When the spectator is confronted with such stimuli configurations, their form and linked content, emotions, values are stored in the long-term memory of an individual or often an entire social group, yet their informational content has in the meantime nonetheless become quite low. Many stereotypes fade, and their form dissolves like that of a dream that escapes our reconstruction.

Since potentially all structural relations of a film composition can reach this stage, filmic stereotypes can appear in the most various forms: as myths, canonical stories, or conventionalized plot patterns, standardized conflicts or typified figures, but also as elementary situations and images that I would like to term filmic archetypes.

To introduce one example: in the dream sequence that starts Fellini's *8 1/2*, filmic archetypes are quite prominent. At first, we witness the protagonist's imprisonment and fear of suffocation in the narrow space of a car stuck in traffic. This is followed by an unexpected liberation that then turns into an unlikely flight across the sea. The act of liberation ends with a bitter crash, when the hero is yanked back by "the others" with a cord that ties him to the ground.

In *8 1/2*, as in other *mise en conscience* films, such archetypal structures play a key role, and an interpretation in terms of cognitive psychology seems to offer itself. Since am I here adopting a term that took on significance in Jungian psychology, an entirely different system of thought, I would like to take a moment to explain my position in greater detail: this includes both the grateful acceptance of some of Jung's empirical observations and distancing myself from other aspects of his theoretical corpus.

Jung, who saw dreams as the "spontaneous self-representation of the current state of the unconscious in a symbolic form of expression,"^{xxx} emphasized the important role of archetypes in dream material. According to his definition, archetypes are

to be understood as specific forms and image-like configurations that are found not only in the same form in all times and places, but also in individual dreams, fantasies, visions, and mad notions. Their repeated occurrence in individual cases as well as their ethnic ubiquity show that the human soul is not only individual and subjective or personal, but also collective and objective. We thus speak on the one hand of a personal unconscious, on the other of a collective unconscious, a layer deeper than that of the personal unconscious, which is closer to consciousness.^{xxxi}

The collective unconscious is made up of "preexistent forms, archetypes that can only become consciousness in a secondary form and grant the contents of consciousness fixed outlines."^{xxxii}

The archetype represents an unconscious matter that changes in its becoming conscious and being perceived in the sense of each individual consciousness in which it emerges.^{xxxiii}

Jung calls this “integration of the unconscious into consciousness” a “process of individuation.”^{xxxiv} Art, in my view, is always tied to the integration of the unconscious into consciousness, and thus recurs to such a process. Analogously, filmic archetypes can thus be understood as form relations that are initially received by the unconscious, but familiar because produced through prior cultural communication with its semantics, emotions, and values. These are perceived and activated in a specific work and the concrete act of reception; in this way, they are returned to consciousness, but the degree of consciousness can only be considered relative. The emergence of such preexistent forms is to be explained as the result of two different relationships of invariance that cross in all cultural stereotypes:^{xxxv} on the one hand, a cognitive invariant lies behind the filmic archetype that the individual gains through the mental appropriation of an object, on the other hand this operation of invariance becomes intersubjectively effective in a sociocultural process of appropriation, resulting in cognitive invariants specific to a particular group.

Jung, however, writes: “The collective unconscious is not developed individually, but is inherited.”^{xxxvi} Elsewhere he writes that the collective unconscious is not derived from personal experience and acquisition, but is “inborn.”^{xxxvii} This more or less metaphorical and abbreviated summary of the complex relationship between individual and sociocultural experience expressed in archetypal forms is misleading to the extent that on first look the emergence of archetypes seems purely biological or genetically determined. On closer

inspection, however, we can also find in Jung an attempt to connect the archetype to experience and cognitive strategies. As he writes:

There are as many archetypes as there are typical situations in life. Endless repetition has left the imprint of these experiences on psychic constitution, not in the form of images that are filled with one content, but rather initially with “forms without content,” which represent merely the possibility of a certain type of worldview and behavior.^{xxxviii}

Archetypes are thus not inherited “imagination” [*Vorstellungen*], but inherited “‘possibilities’ of imagination.”^{xxxix} Jung compares the “*a priori* given possibility of the imaginary form” [*Vorstellungsform*] with the axis system of a crystal, which in a certain sense predetermines crystal formation in the mother liquor, but without having a material existence. The archetypes also have an “invariable core of meaning that only appears in principle, but never concretely determines its mode of appearance.”^{xl} He supports this claim by providing a whole pool of various concrete variants of the mother archetype.

As we know, Jung also developed fields of concrete variants for other archetypes, for the anima, the syzygy motif, the child archetype, the Kore and trickster figures, etc.

Fellini, incidentally, had been directed to some of Jung’s books by Bernhard, a German psychotherapy professor, and called the reading “a pleasant revelation; an exciting, unsuspected, unique confirmation of something that I had only to a small part already suspected.”^{xli} As a film director who used symbolic images in his work, he was particularly impressed by the different ways in which Jung and Freud saw the phenomenon of symbolism:

For Jung, the symbol is a means to express an intuition, for which no better form of expression can be found. For Freud, the symbol is used as a replacement for something subject to repression, and thus cannot be expressed, but must be forgotten. For Jung, the symbol is thus a means to repeat something that can be expressed, if not in an unequivocal way. For Freud, it is a way to repress what is not allowed to be expressed.^{xlii}

To represent what cannot be expressed, and this in a way that is not completely unequivocal: again and again this was Fellini's manner. Jung's view of archetypes thus quite clearly coincided with his own creative program. Jung writes that whatever an archetypal content might say initially seems at like a linguistic simile, but on closer inspection a still unknown third lies behind the two compared phenomena, something unknown and resistant to formulation.^{xliii}

The ambivalence of *8 1/2* thus results to a large extent from its use of archetypes, which never allow for similes with the rational precision of a Brechtian parable, but instead always include an unknown third factor, giving the film a puzzling and opaque quality.

Many fleeting images from dreams and daydreams in *8 1/2* are archetypal in their sense of a "basic pattern of instinctual behavior."^{xliiv} When at one point in the film an intellectual criticizes the film's protagonist, the next shot shows the protagonist hanging from a noose; when the journalists want to know what the film that the protagonist is beginning to make is supposed to look like, we see how Guido then hides under a table and shoots himself in the head. However, these abrupt turns are always subject to a subtle reversal; this also often takes place with the help of archetypes. The bright figure of the "girl from the well,"

embodied by Claudia Cardinale, that idealistic “offering of genuineness that the protagonist no longer knows what to do with,”^{xlv} is a variation of the archetypal Kore figure, as Jung sees in the “unknown young girl” of the Gretchen type.^{xlvi} Aspects of the “earth mother,” described by Jung as “having a primitive or animalistic facial expression—the figure not seldom like the Neolithic ideal of the Venus de Brassempuoy, or that of Willendorf,”^{xlvii} are clearly visible in Saragina.

Numerous times in the film, visual motifs appear that show water: not only Guido’s flight over the sea at the start of the film, but also as the background of the dancing Saragina or in those scenes showing the protagonist sitting in a bath tub, first as a child, later as a successful filmmaker. From this early experience of bathing derives a strange phonetic series that sounds like a magic formula: ASA NISI MASA. The beginning letters of these three words, which the hypnotizer reads from Guido’s thoughts, spell “Anima.” This is the term for the archetype that stands for the inexhaustible life power, symbolized by water and recurring to the myth of creativity. Anima also lies behind the intentions of the main figure, and thus the entire story line of the film. No matter how much the film director Guido might seem like a Münchhausen, a fraud, or at any event someone not all too concerned about truth and morality, behind all his feeling, thought, and action lies the unshakeable drive and compulsion to create—a characterization that clearly distinguishes him from most other intellectual figures from Italian film of this period. This creativity myth is simply a variant of the anima archetype. If the protagonist of *8 1/2* were not so determined by the anima, the film narrative with its confusing multiple layers would lack a decisive main plot line. The archetype takes in the composition the “ordering influence on the consciousness content”^{xlviii} that Jung attributes to it in psychic life. The spectator thus has a solid expectation, a very “strong” hypothesis about the course of action Guido will

ultimately take: he will remain faithful to his basic position! In the conflict between his creative drive and reality, Fellini shifts from the Anima stereotype to the child archetype. Jung writes:

An essential aspect of the child motif is its character of futurity. The child is potential futurity. Thus, the appearance of the child motif in the psychology of an individual is as a rule a anticipation of later development, even if seems at first like to appear like a retrospective figure.^{xlix}

In moments of distress and self-doubt, Guido summons up scenes from his childhood, and the film's conclusion, which takes place after Guido's final canceling of the film project, and thus more or less in his imagination, ends with his friends and acquaintances emerging as figures dressed in white, grasping his hand and, as Fellini puts it, dancing "a happy ring-a-round on a kind of stage "

Guido steps together with Luisa into her circle. Slowly the lights go out, leaving Guido alone as child in the middle of the meadow, one final image of the lost and perhaps regained purity.^l

The memory then leads into the future, and this takes place through a phrase of challenges and hardships in which Guido in a way becomes the lost child to whom attributes mythical powers "that far surpass human measure, representing the strongest and most ineluctable drive, the drive to realize oneself."^{li} In this sense, Metz termed *8 1/2* a "great creative mediation on the inability to create."^{lii} The archetype of the child allows each of these moments in Fellini's *8 1/2* to be clearly recognized. They thus take on a narrative function when they bring stereotype-based experiences into the course of action, giving a focus to the multiplicity of impressions.

VI.

In the late work of Tarkovsky as well, there are numerous filmic stereotypes can be found that go back to archetypal situations and often noticeably structure the composition of the film. Many of these have already been carefully depicted in the motif studies of Maya Turowskaya and Felicita Allardt-Nostitz.^{liii} Particularly in her analysis of *Stalker*, the latter author has convincingly showed that Tarkovsky borrowed countless motifs from German Romanticism; she demonstrates, for example, how the director “takes up the quite familiar romantic myth of the divine child, with which he later concludes his film.”^{liiv} The study of *The Mirror* also contains indications of how Tarkovsky uses motifs from E. T. A . Hoffman or Novalis that stem from an archetypal source and are stored in the cultural memory of Europe.

In *The Mirror*, evident symbolic forms on the level of the stereotype are but seldom. They are generally hidden in documentary shots, like the flight of the captive balloon, in large mass scenes, or even in such expressive scenes like that on Shiwash Lake. Tarkovsky’s hesitation about clearly presented stereotypes can be explained with the following maxim:

The less one shows, the more the spectator has to engage with the little that is there in order to be able to form an opinion about the whole [...] and as far as symbolism is concerned, the symbol in the film is a symbol of the natural state of reality.^{lv}

By being presented to the spectator in the documentary shots, the archetypes are masked, since they are at the same time perceived as undisturbed physical reality.

The ambiguity of this impression not only results from the documentary passages. It is interesting, for example, that in the dreams of *mise-en-conscience* the filmic stereotypes/archetypes are often mixed with structural relations on level of perception, so that some filmic topic series are made up to a large part of a conglomerate of stereotypes that is seamlessly inserted into it. These transitions between structures of a quite different mental status are probably made possible because the two structural types form relative unconscious experiences. Precisely in this processual fusion of heterogeneous forms clearly lies a key characteristic of the actual shape of the dream that we hold as a manifest dream before us. In film, the two structural types form web-like constructions, superimposed onto one another. The likelihood of meaning formation increases in the field of possibility formed when stereotypes and topic series cross.

As far as “*mise en conscience*” films are concerned, it should be noted that the mere existence of stereotypes or perceptive structures in filmic representations of dreams still says very little about how confused or rational a dream event might seem to the spectator. Real dreams exhibit a broad spectrum of variation in terms of comprehension, and in filmic dreams we can recognize a similar space to maneuver to that in real dreams in the various phases of sleep. According to physiologists, during the so-called “rapid eye-movement” (REM) phase of sleep irrational dreams predominate, while in the non-REM phases logical dreams are more central.^{lvi} This corresponds to statements by Jung, which assume the fundamental irrationalism of dreams, but also recognize the existence of clearly causal chain in some dreams, comparing them with a drama in four acts.^{lvii} The aforementioned opening scene of *8 1/2* has such a form, which, if taken as a miniplot, is also quite available to conceptualization: a small, causally linked drama with beginning, middle, and end. The hand grenade scene in *The*

Mirror also follows the dramatic causal chain, but is then later coupled with another scenes that refer to a sense of free association, regulated only using the topoi of distance montage. These courses of action thus follow often more an “irrational” dream structure of the R.E.M phase, but in this concrete case perceptive topics and easily recognizable stereotypes dominate. Fellinis’ dreams in *8 1/2*, in contrast, are often those of the non-REM phase, but there is a great difference between the structures that are based on perception and those based on stereotype: the latter play a clearly more important role, in a quantitative sense as well.

I hope that I have been able to show that in these films, governed by a dream logic, a great deal of what might seem confused in fact exhibits certain regularities—even those of narration—that can perhaps be better understood using a model of topics and stereotypes.

The existence of such regularities might prevent us from accepting a design concept of chaos and arbitrariness, as Fellini’s imitators thought they saw at the time in *8 1/2*, or also to set oneself in state of deep emotional astonishment, as celebrated by Tarkovsky followers still today. I see model descriptions from cognitive psychology in general as an aide in the analysis of modern film, which in my view became a dominant force with the end of the narrative cinema in the 1960s, but which was also foreshadowed much earlier: often, incidentally, by including depictions of dreams, as in German cinema expressionism, French visualism, and the surrealist avant-garde film of Western Europe was already a decisive stylistic influence. Comparable problems of form and analysis continue up into the present. In this way, many postmodern film compositions are analogous to the mentioned films from the 1960s and 1970s; here as well, while causal chains within storytelling were increasingly lacking, the films often

abounded with stereotypes that together with the topic series often carry the cinematic narration. Relationships of meaning still result, and these must be searched for, regardless of how hidden they might be and how difficult it is to distill them. Jung writes.

Our conscious thoughts are often concerned with the future and its possibilities; the unconscious and its dreams are no less concerned with the future. There is even a view spread across the entire world that the main function of dreams is to tell the future.^{lviii}

Representations of dreams in film are thus particularly illuminating for the formation of relations of significance, since they fundamentally refer to possible worlds, the construction of which relies on the value of a view towards future possibilities.

Translated from the German by Brian Currid

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Notes

- i) Jung, Carl Gustav: Vom Wesen der Träume: In: *Traum und Traumdeutung*, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1996, p. 134.
 - ii) See Wuss, Peter: *Filmanalyse und Psychologie. Strukturen des Films im Wahrnehmungsprozess*, Berlin: Edition Sigma 1993;
- Cinematic Narration, Conflict and Problem Solving. In: *Moving Images, Culture & the Mind*. Ed. By Ib Bondebjerg. Luton: University of Luton Press 2000, 105-116;
- Analyzing the Reality Effect. In: On-line journal *The Journal of Moving Image Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 2 (Spring 2002). [http: // www.uca.edu / org / ccsmi / journal2 / index.htm](http://www.uca.edu/org/ccsmi/journal2/index.htm).

- iii) Eco, Umberto: *Das offene Kunstwerk*. Frankfurt /M: Suhrkamp 1977, p. 85.
- iv) Ibid., p. 183.
- v) See: Klaus, Georg: *Kybernetik und Erkenntnistheorie*. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften 1966, p. 65.
- vi) See Wuss: *Filmanalyse und Psychologie*, pp. 53ff.
- vii) Ibid.,97f.
- viii) Fellini, Federico: *8 ½*, Zürich: Diogenes, 1974, p.157.
- ix) See Eco: *Das offene Kunstwerk*, pp. 43ff. ; Wuss: *Die Tiefenstruktur des Filmkunstwerks*, Berlin: Henschelverlag 1990, p. 104.
- x) Tarkowski, Andrej: *Die versiegelte Zeit*. Leipzig / Weimar: Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag 1989, p. 149.
- xi) Ibid., p. 153.
- xii) See Peleshyan, Artavazd: Distance montage, or the theory of distance. In: *Documentary Films of the Armenian Soviet Republic*. Eine Retrospektive des 21. Internationalen Dokumentarfilmfestivals Nyon, Schweiz 1989, pp. 79-102.
- xiii) See Ricardou, Jean, quoted in Schober, Rita: Für einen neuen Realismus, *Weimarer Beiträge*, 1979, 7, p.38.
- xiv) See Lenz, Benjamin. In: *Alain Resnais* (Reihe Film 38) Munich / Wien: Hanser 1990, S.12.
- xv) Eco, Umberto: *Einführung in die Semiotik*, Munich: Fink 1972, p. 151.
- xvi) Eco, Umberto: *Lector in fabula*. Munich: Hanser 1987, p.114.
- xvii) Tarkowskij, Andrej: *Martyrolog. Tagebücher 1970-1986*. Frankfurt/ M.: Limes Verlag, 1989, p.112.
- xviii) Tarkowski: *Die versiegelte Zeit*, p. 149.
- xix) Tarkowskij: *Martyrolog*, p.103.
- xx) Jung: *Vom Wesen der Träume*, p. 50.

- xxi) Tarkowskij: *Martyrolog*, p. 103.
- xxii) Ibid., p.93.
- xxiii) Ibid., p.106.
- xxiv) Ibid. p. 55.
- xxv) Kreimeier, Klaus: Kommentierte Filmographie, *Andrej Tarkowskij* (Reihe Film 39) , Munich/ Wien: Hanser, 1987, p. 127.
- xxvi) Ibid., 133.
- xxvii) Tarkowskij, A.: *Martyrolog*, p. 120.
- xxviii) See Alain Virmaux: Les limites d' une conquete, In: *Etudes cinématographiques 28-28*, 1963, pp. 31ff.
- xxxix) Metz, Christian : *Semiologie des Films*. Munich : Fink. 1972., p.291f.
- xxx) Jung: Vom Wesen der Träume, p. 115.
- xxxii) Ibid., pp. 142f.
- xxxiii) Jung: *Archetypen*: Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1990, p.46
- xxxiiii) Ibid., p.9.
- xxxv) Ibid., p.42.
- xxxvi) See Schweinitz, Jörg: Stereotyp: Vorschlag und Definition eines filmästhetischen Begriffs, *Beiträge zur Film- und Fernsehwissenschaft*, 1987, 29, p.121.
- xxxvii) Jung: *Archetypen*, p.46.
- xxxviii) Ibid., p. 7.
- xxxix) Ibid., p. 51.
- xl) Ibid., p. 69.
- xli) Ibid.: p.79.
- xlii) *Fellini über Fellini*. Ein intimes Gespräch mit Giovanni Grazzini. Zürich: Diogenes 1984, p.132.

xlii) Ibid.,

xliii) Jung: *Archetypen*, pp. 112ff.

xliv) Ibid., p. 46.

xlv) Fellini,: *8 ½*, p.12.

xlvi) Jung: *Archetypen*, p.139.

xlviii) Ibid., p.140

xlviii) Jung, quoted in Wilhelm Laiblin (Ed.) *Märchenforschung und Tiefenpsychologie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991, p.XIV.

xlix) Jung: *Archetypen*, p. 126.

I) Fellini: *8 ½*, p.159.

li) Jung: *Archetypen*, p. 126.

lii) Metz: *Semiologie des Films*, p. 296.

liii) See Turowskaja, Maja / Allard-Nostiz, Felicitas: *Andrej Tarkowskij. Film als Poesie- Poesie als Film*. Bonn: Keil Verlag 1981.

liv) Ibid., p.136.

lv) Tarkowskij: *Martyrolog*, p.101.

lvi) Thomä, Helmut / Kächele, Horst: *Lehrbuch der psychoanalytischen Therapie, Bd. 1, Grundlagen*, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1986, p. 146.

lvii) Jung: *Vom Wesen der Träume*, pp. 146.

lviii) Ibid., p. 60.

ⁱ Carl Gustav Jung, *Vom Wesen der Träume, Traum und Traumdeutung*, Munich: Detuscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996, p. 134.

ⁱⁱ See Peter Wuss, *Filmanalyse und Psychologie. Strukturen des Films im Wahrnehmungsprozeß*. Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1993.

ⁱⁱⁱ Umberto Eco, *Das offene Kunstwerk. ENGLISH? The Open Work*, trans. Anna Cancogni, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1989.

^{iv}Ibid.

- ^v See Georg Klaus, *Kybernetik und Erkenntnistheorie*. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1966, p. 65.
- ^{vi} See Wuss, *Filmanalyse und Psychologie*, pp. 53ff.
- ^{vii} *Ibid.*, 97f.
- ^{viii} Federico Fellini, *8 1/2*, Zürich: Diogenes, 1974, p. 157. ENGLISH?
- ^{ix} See Eco, *Das offene Kunstwerk*, pp. 43ff, und Wuss, *Die Tiefenstruktur des Filmkunstwerks*, Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1990, p, 104.
- ^x Andrej Tarkovski, *Die versiegelte Zeit*, Leipzig: Gustav Kiepenhauer Verlag, 1989, p. 149.
- ^{xi} *Ibid.*, p. 153.
- ^{xii} See Pleschjan, Artavazd, "Distanzmontage oder Die Theorie der Distanz," in *Die Dokumentarfilme der armenischen Sowjetrepublik. Eine Retrospektive des 21. Dokumentarfilmfestivals Nyon, Schweiz*. Nyon/Berlin 1989, pp. 79-102.
- ^{xiii} See Jean Ricardou, quoted in Rita Schober, "Für einen neune Realismus," *Weimarer Beiträge* 7 (1979), p. 38. (ORIGINAL FRENCH?)
- ^{xiv} See Benjamin Lenz, in *Alain Resnais*. Munich: Hanser, 1990.
- ^{xv} Eco, ENGLISH
- ^{xvi} Eco, ENGLISH
- ^{xvii} Tarkowskij, Andrej. *Martyrolog. Tagebücher 1970–1986*. Frankfurt/M: Limes Verlag, 1989, p. 112. ENGLISH: *Time within Time: Diaries 1970–1986*, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair, London: Faber and Faber, 1994.
- ^{xviii} Tarkowskij, *Die versiegelte Zeit*, p. 149. (ENGLISH)
- ^{xix} Tarkowskij, *Martyrolog*, p. 103.
- ^{xx} Jung, "Vom Wesen der Träume," p. 50.
- ^{xxi} Tarkowskij, *Martyrolog*, p. 103
- ^{xxii} *Ibid.*, p. 93.
- ^{xxiii} *Ibid.*, p. 106.
- ^{xxiv} *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- ^{xxv} Klaus Kreimeier, "Kommentierte Filmographie," *Andrej Tarkowskij*. Munich/Wien: Hanser, p. 127.
- ^{xxvi} *Ibid.*, p. 133.
- ^{xxvii} Tarkowskij, *Martyrolog*, p. 120.
- ^{xxviii} See Alain Virmaux, "Les limites d'une conquete," In: *Etudes cinématographiques* 28-29, 1963, pp. 31ff.
- ^{xxix} Christian Metz, *Semiologie des Films*. ENGLISH
- ^{xxx} Jung, "Vom Wesen der Träume," p. 115.
- ^{xxxi} *Ibid.*, pp. 142f.
- ^{xxxii} Jung, *Archetypen*, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, p. 46.
- ^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, p. 9
- ^{xxxiv} *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- ^{xxxv} See Jörg Schweinitz, "Stereotyp: Vorschlag und Definition eines filmästhetischen Begriffs," in *Beiträge zur Film und Fernsehwissenschaft*, 29 (1987), p. 121.
- ^{xxxvi} Jung, *Archetypen*, p. 46.
- ^{xxxvii} *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- ^{xxxviii} *Ibid.*, p. 51.
- ^{xxxix} *Ibid.*, p. 69.
- ^{xl} *Ibid.*, p. 79.
- ^{xli} Fellini ENGLISH
- ^{xlii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xliii} Jung, *Archetypen*, pp. 112ff.
- ^{xliv} *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- ^{xlv} Fellini, *8 1/2*, p. 12.
- ^{xlvi} Jung, *Archetypen*, p. 139.
- ^{xlvii} *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- ^{xlviii} Jung, quoted in Wilhem Laiblin, ed. *Märchenforschung und Tiefenpsychologie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991. p. 14.
- ^{xlix} Jung, *Archetypen*, pp. 120f.
- ^l Fellini, *8 1/2*, p. 159.
- ^{li} Jung, *Archetypen*, p. 126.
- ^{lii} Metz, *Semiologie des Films*, p. 296.
- ^{liii} See Maja Turowskaja/Felecitas Allardt-Nostitz, *Andrej Tarkowskij. Film als Poesie – Poesie als Film*. Bonn: Keil Verlag, 1981.

^{liv} Ibid., p. 136.

^{lv} Tarkowskij, Martyrologue p. 101.

^{lvi} Helmut Thomä and Horst Kächele, *Lehrbuch der psychoanalytischen Therapie, Band 1, Grundlagen*, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1986, p. 146.

^{lvii} Jung, *Vom Wesen der Träume*, pp. 146f.

^{lviii} Ibid., p. 60.